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The office of the Chief Justice of the United States has received 
considerable renown but has been the subject of relatively little re-
search.  It is common to refer to the Chief as primus inter pares, but lit-
tle attention has been paid to the relative significance of the primus as 
opposed to the pares.  The office of the Chief Justice has been consid-
ered “second in national authority and prestige only to the presi-
dent,”1 and is said to have “sweeping, if usually unstated, powers and 
significance.”2  Yet the Chief Justice has relatively little actual authority 
over the Associate Justices who serve contemporaneously, and the 
“fact that a chief justice must work his will with eight independent 
souls not chosen by him is a formidable barrier to his success.”3  Jus-
tice Frankfurter described the Supreme Court as an “institution in 
which every man is his own sovereign.”4  More colorfully, then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist referred to Associate Justices as being “as 
independent as hogs on ice.”5  Thus, the actual influence of the Chief 
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1 ROBERT J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE:  LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT, at xii 
(1986). 
2 Tony Mauro, More Than One Justice Among Nine, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at 
10. 
3 STEAMER, supra note 1, at 294; see also LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 
164-65 (7th ed. 2001) (describing the “significant limits on the chief ’ s capacity to in-
fluence the Court”). 
4 FELIX FRANKFURTER, Chief Justices I Have Known, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE 
SUPREME COURT:  EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 471, 
491 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970). 
5 William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justices I Never Knew, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637, 
637 (1976). 
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Justice on the Court may be disputed and may vary over time depend-
ing on the particular composition of the bench and the personality 
and inclinations of the individual Chief Justice. 
The recent sad death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist has 
prompted tributes to his influence on the Court as Chief Justice.  
Mark Tushnet, the prominent liberal constitutional law professor, de-
clared that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Earl Warren 
were the twentieth century’s two great Chief Justices, as “[b]oth pre-
sided over courts that changed the law in a very dramatic way.”6  Pro-
fessor A.E. Dick Howard suggested that “[w]e will look back on the 
Rehnquist court as one of the smoothest in the court’s history.”7  
Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times declared that Justice 
Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief was “one of the most consequential,” dur-
ing which he “managed to translate many of his long-held views into 
binding national precedent.”8  According to the Washington Post, judi-
cial restraint will be the Rehnquist Court’s legacy, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s personal “considerable achievement” was his “effective-
ness as chief.”9  Taking a slightly different perspective, however, 
Greenhouse suggested that the Rehnquist Court’s legacy was the 
growth of the Supreme Court’s own power.10  Some disagreed with 
claims about Justice Rehnquist’s influence, suggesting that “during 
some of the most heated battles, rather than an influential chief rally-
ing the court, Rehnquist was the court’s missing man, seeming to 
watch from the sidelines.”11  Thus, the impact of our most recent 
Chief Justice appears still open to question. 
A considerable amount of historical evidence, including that 
drawn from judicial biographies, has provided critical information 
about the role and responsibilities of the Chief Justice, as well as about 
the influence of individual Chiefs over time.  Like all anecdotal evi-
6 Charles Lane, The Rehnquist Legacy:  33 Years Turning Back the Court, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 5, 2005, at A8. 
7 Charles Lane & Fred Barbash, Two Vacancies Give Bush a Chance to Solidify Court’s 
Right, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A9. 
8 Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Dies at 80, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A16. 
9 Editorial, The Rehnquist Era, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A30. 
10 See Greenhouse, supra note 8, at A16 (“In the zero-sum game of the tripartite 
separation of powers, the Supreme Court’s own power grew correspondingly as the 
[Rehnquist Court] justices circumscribed the power of Congress.”). 
11 Cliff Sloan, Editorial, A Limited Legacy, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A31.  Sloan 
pointed to affirmative action, the Establishment Clause, abortion, and defendants’ 
rights as areas where Rehnquist failed to influence the Court, but conceded that some 
influence could be found in federalism questions.  Id. 
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dence, however, its reliability is uncertain.  Such evidence can mislead 
by failing to uncover systematic trends or by relying on selective and 
unrepresentative stories.  More rigorous quantitative empirical re-
search on the role of the Chief Justice has been relatively sparse, al-
though what does exist has provided some important insights. 
This Article provides some additional empirical evidence on the 
effects of the Chief on the Court’s deliberations, as well as the effects 
of elevation to the position on the Chief himself.  We investigate 
whether decision-making trends on the Supreme Court shifted when 
Justice Rehnquist replaced Chief Justice Warren Burger.  In particu-
lar, we consider changes in ideological trends in Court outcomes, co-
hesion among the Justices, and the Court’s docket.  In addition, we 
evaluate the extent to which Justice Rehnquist altered his own behav-
ior following his elevation to Chief Justice in 1986. 
I.  THE POWER OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE:  EXISTING EVIDENCE 
Some existing research addresses the role and influence of the 
Chief Justice.  Various analyses have considered the sources of the 
Chief’s institutional powers and the potential influence these powers 
enable the Chief to exercise over his fellow Justices.12  These analyses 
typically look to anecdotal examples in support of their claims; this re-
search is addressed in Part A.  While relatively little rigorous quantita-
tive research has addressed the role of the Chief Justice, Part B reviews 
the research that does exist. 
A.  Institutional Powers 
The Chief Justice may cast only one vote of nine in individual 
cases, the same as the other members of the Court.  Nevertheless, the 
Chief does enjoy certain institutional powers that might be used to 
steer the Court in a particular direction.  The Chief Justice serves as 
the Court’s titular leader, as well as its actual leader in important re-
spects.  For example, she presides over conference deliberations and, 
when in the majority, assigns the opinion.  The Chief Justice is also 
given several administrative powers that other Justices do not possess, 
and these might be implemented in a fashion that would give the 
12 One fine review of this research is found in Sue Davis, The Chief Justice and Judi-
cial Decision-Making:  The Institutional Basis for Leadership on the Supreme Court, in SU-
PREME COURT DECISION-MAKING:  NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 135 (Cornell 
W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT DECISION-
MAKING]. 
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Chief some influence over the Court as a whole.  This Part examines 
some of those influences and how they might create some power to 
affect case outcomes. 
First, the Chief presides over oral argument and the subsequent 
conference at which the Justices vote on case outcomes.  This enables 
her to speak first and provides her with the option to vote last on con-
tested cases.13  The authority to speak first conveys an agenda-setting 
power that may be quite important because it enables the Chief to “di-
rect discussion and frame alternatives.”14  Indeed, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist regarded the ability to speak first and structure the legal 
arguments as a key “advantage” of his position.15  He also stressed that 
“what the conference shapes up like is pretty much what the chief jus-
tice makes it.”16  Jefferson Powell suggested that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist took advantage of this authority and “shifted the center of 
the discussion.”17
Occasionally, the Chief Justice may be able to take advantage of 
the Condorcet paradox to manipulate the outcome.18  This paradox, 
amplified in Arrow’s famous Theorem, involves nontransitive prefer-
ences.19  A majority may prefer option A to B, option B to C, but op-
tion C to A.  In this case, the resolution of the decision is entirely de-
pendent on the order in which the dichotomous options are 
considered, thus providing the agenda-setter with considerable power 
over outcomes.  The probability that such a set of manipulable prefer-
ences exists in a given case is not high,20 however, and even the low 
probability is eliminated when preferences are “single-peaked,” such 
13 WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 82 (1964).  The voting 
order has changed over time at the Court.  DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER:  THE 
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 204-05 (6th ed. 2003).  The Chief Justice may 
pass, though, to avoid early commitment or change his vote after other votes are cast. 
14 BAUM, supra note 3, at 165. 
15 Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 647. 
16 O’BRIEN, supra note 13, at 200 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist). 
17 Richard W. Garnett, Right On, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 34 (quoting Jeffer-
son Powell, Professor, Duke Law School). 
18 See MURPHY, supra note 13, at 85-87 (describing “[t]he voting paradox [that] 
might take place in a decision-making body where more than two alternatives . . . [are] 
available to the group.”). 
19 DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 48-51 (1991). 
20 See KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS:  RATIONAL-
ITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 52-53 (1997) (noting that over ninety percent of 
preference configurations are not so manipulable, when a group of three persons 
chooses among three alternatives). 
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as when they are ideologically driven.21  Yet the Chief may also be able 
to take advantage of characteristics of the Court beyond the existence 
of any intransitive preferences.  By controlling the conference, for ex-
ample, the Chief may be able to pick the most strategic time to call a 
vote, such as when a swing vote appears to be leaning in the desired 
direction.  Furthermore, like any chairperson, the Chief can exercise 
some control over the content of the discussion at the conference.  
Some Chiefs have used this control to their advantage:  Chief Justice 
Hughes, for example, was known for dominating conference delibera-
tions.22
Policymakers’ ability to manipulate outcomes through agenda-
setting or issue-structuring is known as heresthetics, a word William 
Riker coined and defined as the ability of a “prospective loser to rear-
range politics to his or her advantage.”23  Riker wrote extensively on 
such strategic actions, illustrated by historical examples of strategies 
used by politicians to influence policy outcomes.24  A Chief Justice may 
similarly use this power by “constructing choice situations in order to 
manipulate outcomes—most notably, by adding alternatives, control-
ling the agenda, and voting in a sophisticated fashion.”25  One study 
indicates that the nature of the sequential voting at conference en-
ables strategic behavior to influence outcomes and that the Chief Jus-
tice has engaged in such behavior to a statistically significant degree.26  
The Chief may also have other tools at her disposal to shape the 
Court’s decision making.  For example, in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,27 Chief Justice Warren strategically used his authority to separate 
the merits from the remedy in order to secure a unanimous opinion.28
21 FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 19, at 48. 
22 See MURPHY, supra note 13, at 87 (describing how Chief Justice Hughes domi-
nated conferences “armed both with heavily marked volumes of the U.S. Reports and a 
photographic memory”). 
23 William H. Riker, Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model, in ADVANCES IN THE 
SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING 46, 50 (James M. Enelow & Melvin J. Hinich eds., 1990). 
24 For more on Riker’s heresthetic theories, see WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF 
POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986); William H. Riker, The Heresthetics of Constitution-
Making:  The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice, 78 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1984). 
25 Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, Heresthetical Maneuvering on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
14 J. THEORETICAL POL. 93, 93-94 (2002). 
26 See Kirk Randazzo et al., Strategic and Sequential Voting During the Burger 
Court (2002) (Research Paper, Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Asso-
ciation, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).   
 27 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
28 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 90-91 (1983). 
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The Chief’s functional heresthetic authority at conference may be 
limited, however, at least in modern times.  If all the Justices have 
made up their minds about the case prior to the conference delibera-
tions, they may not be subject to much strategic manipulation.  In 
contemporary conferences at the Court, there is little “give and take” 
among the Justices, and minds appear to be already made up.29  Jus-
tice Scalia once declared that the conference was less an interchange 
than it was a statement of the independent views of each individual 
Justice.30  Empirical studies of voting fluidity on the Court have not 
specifically addressed the effect of the conference but have found 
relatively little change in the votes of the Justices at various stages of 
the decision-making process.  Segal and Spaeth find that strong fluid-
ity—where Justices switch their votes over the course of the decision-
making process—rarely occurs, and “when it does it disproportion-
ately happens because most of the justices switch their votes to avoid a 
decision on the merits of the controversy.”31
Moreover, evidence supporting a strong association between the 
individual Justices’ ideologies and their voting behavior calls into 
question the extent to which votes may be influenced at conference or 
otherwise.  Where the Justices’ votes are essentially predetermined by 
their ideological and policy preferences, little room exists for other 
factors—including the potential influence of the Chief Justice—to 
shape their decisions.  Political scientists frequently maintain that the 
ideological character of the Justices’ individual voting behavior re-
mains largely stable over time,32 although some quantitative evidence 
suggests that several Justices’ preferences have shifted during their 
tenure on the Court.33  One study in particular found that while most 
Justices’ preferences remained unaltered over a long periods of time 
(Justice Brennan, for example, remained consistently liberal and Jus-
tice Powell remained consistently conservative), for a few Justices a 
dramatic change was observable.  Justice Black’s voting record became 
steadily more liberal for years until he exhibited a sudden shift to the 
right at the end of his tenure on the Court, while Justice Douglas be-
29 O’BRIEN, supra note 13, at 258. 
30 Davis, supra note 12, at 145. 
31 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITU-
DINAL MODEL REVISITED 287 (2002). 
32 See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905, 911 n.2 (1988). 
33 See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences Change?  A Longitudinal Study of 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801, 810 (1998) (noting the shift in Justice Black-
mun’s liberalism and Justice Reed’s conservatism over time). 
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gan as a moderate liberal and later became the most liberal of the Jus-
tices.  Similarly, Justice Blackmun’s voting became progressively more 
liberal the longer he served on the Court.34  The study did not sug-
gest, however, that these shifts were linked in any way to the influence 
of the Chief Justice. 
The Chief may also potentially influence the Court’s policymaking 
at the case selection stage.  The Chief Justice controls the conferences 
in which the Justices determine which cases to accept on writ of cer-
tiorari.35  This authority may produce a greater impact than the 
Chief’s presiding authority over the conference in which the Justices 
vote on the merits.  Given the vast number of cert petitions, individual 
Justices are less able to attend carefully to individual cases, so they may 
be more willing to defer to the Chief’s leadership.  Moreover, the 
Chief Justice creates the “discuss list” that generally determines the 
petitions that the Court considers fully,36 although other Justices may 
add cases to this list if they choose.37  According to one scholar, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist used this authority to “push[] into the mainstream 
once idiosyncratic views of state sovereignty and limited federal 
power.”38  This ability to shape the Court’s docket certainly could have 
contributed to what some scholars have claimed to be his success in 
“shaping the law in selected areas that are central to his agenda.”39
Another matter decided at the certiorari stage is the simple num-
ber of cases that the Court will accept for hearing on the merits.  The 
Chief Justice is said to “disproportionately influence policy over . . . 
34 Id. at 811 fig.3. 
35 See O’BRIEN, supra note 13, at 198-207 (discussing this process under Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and how he changed the procedures from previous Courts). 
36 BAUM, supra note 3, at 107. 
37 See John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13 
(1983) (describing the Chief Justice’s practice of circulating “a list of cases that he 
deems worthy of discussion [to which] each of the other members of the Court may 
add cases”).  In practice, though, the Chief Justice is predominant in determining the 
cases discussed.  See Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Judicial Behavior:  
Agenda-Setting Via the Discuss List 11, 39-40 tbl.1 (Aug. 1997) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (showing that in the 
1990 Term Chief Justice Rehnquist placed more cases on the discuss list—fifty-eight 
percent—than all the other Justices combined).  Historically, the Chief’s control was 
even greater; Chief Justice Warren placed ninety-five percent of the cases on the dis-
cuss list.  Id. at 10. 
38 Garnett, supra note 17, at 34; see also Lane, supra note 6, at A9 (quoting Dean 
John C. Jeffries of the University of Virginia Law School as stating, “You can’t identify 
anyone who’s had more to do with the revival of federalism than Bill Rehnquist”). 
39 See Davis, supra note 12, at 142-43 (citing the law of habeas corpus as well as fed-
eralism decisions as examples of Rehnquist’s successful law-shaping). 
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the size of the docket.”40  The number of cases decided by the Court 
has fluctuated considerably over the years, and the Rehnquist Court is 
known for its paucity of decisions.41  Indeed, in recent years, the Court 
has decided only about half as many cases as it once did, a reduction 
made more remarkable by the dramatic increase in circuit court cases 
during this same time period.42  The cause of this “incredibly shrink-
ing docket” has been debated by commentators.43  Sue Davis suggests 
it may be attributed to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concern for Court 
“efficiency” and his “strategy to reduce the role of the Court and to let 
conservative decisions of Reagan-Bush-packed lower federal courts 
stand.”44  The latter explanations are probably not complete, however, 
because by affirming the conservative decisions of lower courts, the 
Supreme Court could amplify their power while reducing its own role 
through limiting language, thereby accomplishing the same goal 
through a completely different method—accepting more cert peti-
tions.  Thus, the shrunken docket remains something of a mystery. 
Yet even at the certiorari level, the influence of the Chief Justice 
may be limited by circumstances and Associate Justice preferences.45  
Just as in decision making, the Chief has only a single vote of nine on 
the decision whether to grant or deny certiorari.  It is now well-
established that the certiorari decision is an ideological and strategic 
one, in which individual Justices calculate the likely consequences of 
40 Mauro, supra note 2, at 10. 
41 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 12, at 146 (“[D]uring the 1995 term the Court de-
cided only seventy-five cases, less than half of the 175 decided in the 1984 term and the 
lowest number since the 1953 term.”); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the 
Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 430 (noting that as Chief Justice, Rehnquist 
has been more willing to reject cases for review with holdings with which he disagrees 
but which have little precedential value). 
42 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYS-
TEM 222 fig.9.2 (2005) (displaying graphically the increase in cases filed in circuit 
court, which exceeded twenty-five percent between 1992 and 2003). 
43 See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s 
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 750-93 (2001) (discussing various theories 
explaining the reduced docket and analyzing them using data on conference votes); 
Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 557-59 (1998) (reviewing LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)) (suggesting reasons for 
the reduced docket). 
44 Davis, supra note 12, at 146.  Rehnquist clearly “moved to trim the Court’s 
docket.”  Mauro, supra note 2, at 11. 
45 See Davis, supra note 12, at 147 (noting that “the complex interaction between 
the outcome and jurisprudential modes among his eight colleagues is likely to dimin-
ish his ability to secure the three necessary votes to grant certiorari”). 
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the Court taking up a case.46  While the Chief has some informational 
power over this decision, she has no specific powers to control the 
agenda that would enable her to control certiorari decisions in the 
face of a willful opposition. 
The most commonly considered and apparently influential power 
of the Chief Justice is the authority to assign opinion writing when in 
the majority.  Although the Chief Justice votes first—the Court votes 
in order of seniority—he may strategically pass in order to ensure 
membership in the majority if desired.47  The Chief Justice may assign 
opinion writing to the individual Justice best able to hold together a 
fragile coalition, to an ideologically amenable colleague, or to himself.  
This power has been called the position’s “single most influential 
function,”48 a conclusion based on a belief that “opinion authors have 
a disproportionate influence on the content of an opinion.”49  More-
over, the Chief’s assignment power may provide other forms of lever-
age over the other Justices.  In theory, the Chief Justice may also use 
her position to punish or reward Justices for whatever reason she 
chooses.50  Nevertheless, strategic assignments do not always produce 
perfect outcomes from the standpoint of the Chief and may even 
blowback and disadvantage her interests.51
Even independent of specific structural leadership powers, the 
very title of “Chief Justice” may provide an amorphous source of lead-
46 See SEGAL ET AL., supra note 42, at 285-89 (describing this strategic calculus and 
presenting empirical information on how individual Justices have employed it); see also 
Davis, supra note 12, at 147 (observing that the decision involves strategic considera-
tions “including whether the case is a good vehicle or whether there is likely to be a 
better case for pulling a swing justice and for achieving one’s long-range goals”). 
47 See Timothy R. Johnson et al., Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 349, 357 (2005) (discussing how requiring a minimum 
four-member coalition to grant certiorari increases uncertainty and renders the Chief 
Justice more prone to delay his vote). 
48 O’BRIEN, supra note 13, at 269. 
49 Forrest Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice:  New Institutionalist Approaches 
to Supreme Court Decision-making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra note 12, at 
43, 53. 
50 When Justice Souter was asked why he joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in singing 
carols at the annual Christmas party of the Court, he explained, “I have to.  Otherwise 
I get all the tax cases.”  Tony Mauro, Courtside, The Highs and Lows of the 1992 Court, LE-
GAL TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at 12, 14.  While he was presumably joking, he “touched on 
an important reality.”  BAUM, supra note 3, at 166.  Justice Blackmun reported that a 
Justice in Chief Justice Burger’s “doghouse” would be assigned a “crud” opinion “that 
nobody wants to write.”  Id. 
51 See Cross, supra note 43, at 517-19 (discussing the complexity of opinion assign-
ment and backlash by other Justices against Chief Justice Burger’s obvious strategic 
ploys to control assignments). 
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ership authority.  Walter Murphy suggests that “there is an expecta-
tion that a titular leader will exert both task and social leadership,” so 
that a “Chief Justice generally has an initial psychological advantage 
over any Associate Justice in a struggle for influence within the 
Court.”52  Chief Justices have employed a wide array of different lead-
ership styles throughout history.53  For example, Chief Justice Hughes 
reportedly ran the conference like a drill sergeant, while Chief Justice 
Stone ran conferences loosely, allowing lengthy debates among the 
Justices.54  Chief Justice Warren’s success has been attributed to his 
collegial leadership qualities,55 in comparison to Chief Justice Burger, 
who reportedly had “limited impact” due to his lack of effective lead-
ership skills.56  A seminal study has analyzed this leadership role for 
several past Chief Justices.57
Thus, while the unique attributes of being the Chief Justice might 
seem to convey some special power, the extent of that power is un-
clear and may vary from Chief to Chief.  As Chief Justice Chase de-
clared: 
[The Chief] is but one of eight judges, each of whom has the same pow-
ers as himself.  His judgment has no more weight, and his vote no more 
importance, than those of his brethren.  He presides, and a good deal of 
extra labor is thrown upon him.  That’s all.
58
Chief Justice Stone suggested that the Chief may be disadvantaged, 
compared to the other Justices, as the one who “has to do the things 
that the janitor will not do.”59  Chief Justices apparently do not feel 
empowered to direct the Court. 
The Chief Justice has also increasingly been assigned administra-
tive duties for the federal judiciary, in an amount that is “almost over-
52 MURPHY, supra note 13, at 83. 
53 See generally STEAMER, supra note 1 (breaking down the leadership styles of all 
the Chief Justices). 
54 Id. at 27-28. 
55 BAUM, supra note 3, at 166-67. 
56 Id. at 167. 
57 David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Su-
preme Court, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS:  READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND BEHAV-
IOR 506 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 1978) (comparing the relative imple-
mentation of the leadership role in taking cases, hearing oral argument, conferencing, 
and creating unanimity of Chief Justices Taft, Hughes, and Stone). 
58 Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States:  Primus Inter Pares, 17 
J. PUB. L. 20, 22 (1968). 
59 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE:  PILLAR OF THE LAW 281 
(1956). 
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whelming.”60  Some of these powers are obviously significant, such as 
the ability to select the judges who in turn select a special prosecutor 
to investigate administration figures.61  One significant administrative 
power is probably the Chief’s role in lobbying for the federal judici-
ary’s budget and other matters of concern (such as caseload limita-
tions).  It is unlikely, however, that much connection exists between 
these administrative duties and case outcomes.  Indeed, the increasing 
“burden of administrative duties” may even hamper the Chief Justice’s 
ability to influence decision making.62
One study has drawn a connection between the Chief Justice’s 
budgetary and lobbying responsibilities and the Court’s decisions, im-
plicitly affirming the Chief Justice’s influence over case outcomes.63  
Eugenia Toma hypothesizes that Congress uses its appropriation au-
thority to signal its approval or disapproval of the ideological pattern 
of Supreme Court opinions, and that the Chief Justice takes these sig-
nals and correspondingly modifies the pattern of opinions in order to 
better conform to congressional preferences and thereby increase the 
judicial budget.  Her study of budgets and decisions between 1946 and 
1988 found that the larger the distance between Court ideology and 
congressional ideology, the smaller the budget increase.  Then, for 
several Chief Justices during the period, the Court responded by pro-
ducing decisions more in line with congressional preferences.64  In 
contrast, subsequent and more detailed research has suggested that 
there is little relationship between congressional preferences and Su-
preme Court decisions.65
Regardless of this budgetary connection, the Chief Justice’s ad-
ministrative authority can affect the conditions of service on the Su-
preme Court.  Chief Justice Burger modernized and expanded the 
administration of the Court and redecorated its facilities.66  Chief Jus-
60 STEAMER, supra note 1, at 14.  Chief Justice Warren described his schedule as 
“backbreaking,” with his mornings filled by administrative responsibilities.  Id. at 17. 
61 See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s role in the investigation and impeachment of President Clinton). 
62 BAUM, supra note 3, at 165. 
63 See Eugenia F. Toma, A Contractual Model of the Voting Behavior of the Supreme 
Court:  The Role of the Chief Justice, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 433, 434 (1996) (“The [Su-
preme Court and Congress] enter into a contract of budgetary favors in exchange for 
politically influenced output.”). 
64 Id. at 441-43. 
65 See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and 
Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 35 (1997) (concluding that evidence that the Su-
preme Court responds to congressional preferences is “far from convincing”). 
66 STEAMER, supra note 1, at 177-78. 
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tice Warren unsuccessfully sought appropriations for cars and drivers 
for the Justices and these efforts were “appreciated” by his brethren.67  
While we don’t know if the Chief Justice receives any decisional “pay-
back” for her administrative efforts, such an effect is plausible. 
Whether or not the Chief Justice’s lobbying and administrative 
budgetary role affects specific Court decisions, it may still have a 
broader policy impact.  The Chief serves as chairman of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States and makes its committee assign-
ments.  The Judicial Conference is composed of circuit court and dis-
trict court judges who choose issues of interest to the judiciary to 
bring before Congress.  Chief Justice Rehnquist strategically used this 
authority to obtain Judicial Conference recommendations tightening 
habeas corpus relief.68  Such action can provoke legislation that has an 
indirect effect on judicial decisions and an even more direct effect on 
the Court’s docket. 
Federal statutes also assign to the Chief Justice other potentially 
significant appointment powers.69  Most prominent among these pow-
ers is the ability to appoint judges to specialized courts, including the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,70 the Alien Terrorist Removal 
Court,71 and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.72  The po-
tential exists for the Chief to use this appointment power strategically 
to achieve political ends.73  Moreover, these powers have expanded 
over time,74 and Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist have appointed 
scores of judges to special tribunals.75
Chief Justices have other extrajudicial sources of authority as well.  
Occasionally, the constitutional power of the Chief Justice to preside 
67 Id. at 19. 
68 David C. Nixon, Policy-Making by Different Means:  The Chief Justice’s Attempts to 
Shape Policy Through the Judicial Conference of the United States, 15 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 
345, 356-57 (2003). 
69 For an excellent discussion and critique of these powers, see Theodore W. 
Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341 (2004). 
70 See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)-(d) (Supp. 2002) (giving the Chief Justice power to ap-
point eleven judges, and setting the tenures of those judges). 
71 See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2000) (stipulating the Chief Justice’s appointment pow-
ers to establish a removal court). 
72 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2000) (giving the Chief Justice power to designate 
seven circuit court and district court judges to sit on the panel). 
73 Ruger, supra note 69, at 390. 
74 See id. at 351 (describing the “gradual accretion of the Chief’s appointment au-
thority”). 
75 See id. at 390 (observing that Burger and Rehnquist appointed over 125 judges 
to these panels). 
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over impeachment proceedings76 may become substantial, as when 
Chief Justice Rehnquist presided over the impeachment trial of Presi-
dent Clinton.77  Until recently, the Ethics in Government Act empow-
ered the Chief Justice to assign judges to a special division of the D.C. 
Circuit created for the purpose of appointing independent counsels 
to investigate the executive.78  The latter power became quite signifi-
cant when the judges of the special division removed Robert Fiske, the 
original counsel investigating Whitewater during the Clinton Admini-
stration, and replaced him with Kenneth Starr.79  This action was po-
litically controversial and may have tainted the subsequent impeach-
ment proceedings against President Clinton.80  All of these powers 
could conceivably translate into some additional influence over deci-
sions, but the connection seems relatively remote. 
In addition to formal legal powers, both judicial and extrajudicial, 
Chief Justices have assumed responsibility for Court cohesion.  Past 
Chiefs’ successes in this regard may be measured in part by their abil-
ity to produce unanimous or near-unanimous decisions, since such 
decisions seem more authoritative and yield more respect for a rul-
ing.81  Chief Justice Taft wrote that he was “expected to promote team-
work by the Court, so as to give weight and solidarity to its opinions.”82  
The ability to produce unanimous decisions in controversial cases, 
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
77 For a brief discussion of this role, see Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional 
Disputes:  Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 101 n.478 (1999). 
78 28 U.S.C. § 49(d) (2000). 
79 See Susan Schmidt, Judges Replace Fiske as Whitewater Counsel:  Ex-Solicitor General 
Starr To Take Over Probe, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1994, at A1 (discussing the controversy 
surrounding this decision).  For a review of the occurrence and its fallout, see John Q. 
Barrett, Special Division Agonistes, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 17, 33-38 (2000). 
80 See Fred H. Altshuler, Comparing the Nixon and Clinton Impeachments, 51 HASTINGS 
L.J. 745, 750 (2000) (describing the Starr appointment as “suspect from the outset” for 
Clinton supporters).  Critics charged that the special division was partisan.  See, e.g., 
Abbe D. Lowell, Starr Flap Shows Need for Reform, NAT’L L.J., May 13, 1996, at A19 (not-
ing that the choice of Republicans by both Attorney General Reno and the Special 
Court was “based on the assumption that an attorney from the party not in office will 
not overlook any wrongdoing”).  For a brief history of the appointment controversy, 
see John Q. Barrett, Independent Counsel Law Improvements for the Next Five Years, 51 
ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 646-47 (1999). 
81 See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 106 (1998) (dis-
cussing an important school desegregation ruling and the Justices’ understanding that 
“a unanimous opinion in such a major case would have a greater chance of remaining 
undisturbed by external political actors than a divided opinion”). 
82 MURPHY, supra note 13, at 83. 
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such as Brown83 and United States v. Nixon84, are often regarded as vital, 
since the “decisions would have lost much of their authority had there 
been dissenting opinions around which the opposition might have ral-
lied.”85  Chief Justice Hughes attempted “to secure as great a degree of 
unanimity as was possible without compromising the integrity of the 
majority opinion.”86  Indeed, each additional vote for the majority 
opinion, even short of unanimity, appears to have some functional 
power.87  Chief Justices have differed in the importance they place on 
this virtue, however, and Chief Justice Stone may even have consid-
ered cohesiveness a negative.88  In general, however, “chief justices 
display a special level of institutional concern” for producing larger 
majority opinions.89
This responsibility may not be welcomed by the Chief, however, 
since it requires the Chief Justice to “spend much precious time and 
energy in cajoling his colleagues” or to “join the majority even when 
in disagreement with it.”90  In this sense, the position of Chief Justice 
may produce “golden shackles” that limit the Chief’s individual free-
dom.  In particular, the Chief’s responsibility to promote Court cohe-
sion may constitute a special burden if it reduces the ideological 
power of the Chief Justice.  The Chief may have to compromise her 
preferences in order to build a greater majority or control the assign-
ment of the opinion.  According to one commentator, for example, 
 83  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 84  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
85 STEAMER, supra note 1, at 25; see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE 
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR 
EQUALITY 694-99 (1975) (discussing Chief Justice Warren’s efforts to achieve unanim-
ity and avoid even concurring opinions in Brown); Charles M. Lamb & Lisa K. Parshall, 
United States v. Nixon Revisited:  A Case Study in Supreme Court Decision-Making, 58 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 71, 107-08 (1996) (suggesting that the Court’s desire to make Nixon 
unanimous was intended to give the President no excuse for noncompliance). 
86 Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice 
Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 5, 19 (1949). 
87 See Cross, supra note 43, at 555-56 (noting that this may explain why 5-4 opin-
ions are exceptional, as most winning coalitions contain more than the necessary five 
Justices). 
88 See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (examining Chief Justice Stone’s 
leadership of the Court). 
89 SEGAL ET AL., supra note 42, at 336. 
90 STEAMER, supra note 1, at 25. 
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Justice Rehnquist became more “muted and focused” upon ascending 
to the position of Chief Justice.91
The influence of the Chief Justice on case outcomes is thus un-
clear in the sense that she enjoys no unique institutional powers suffi-
cient to enable him to drive the Court in a particular ideological di-
rection, at least in individual cases.  On the other hand, at the 
margins, her authority—via docket composition and majority opinion 
assignment—may be sufficient to shift the Court’s decisions in a par-
ticular direction over time, assuming she has sufficient allies on the 
Court who support her agenda.  In that sense, her influence is clearly 
contingent and conditional, rather than direct. 
B.  Empirical Research on the Influence of the Chief Justice 
While only limited empirical research on the influence of the 
Chief Justice on the Court’s decision making exists, some analyses 
have begun to emerge.  Opinion assignment has been most studied 
because it is the most direct and readily observable power of the Chief 
Justice.  The conclusions drawn from these studies are mixed, but the 
best research shows that “in some cases the Chief’s assignments ap-
pear to be designed to further his policy objectives, while in other 
cases assignments reflect concerns about the smooth operation of the 
Court.”92  The ability to assign opinions is constrained by the need to 
balance opinion writing among the Justices and by external considera-
tions as well.93
In addition, it is unclear that opinion assignment necessarily con-
trols the content of the opinion.  The writer must accommodate the 
other Justices in the majority.  One empirical study suggests that the 
91 Lane, supra note 6, at A9 (quoting Professor Dennis Hutchinson); see also 
Mauro, supra note 2, at 10 (quoting Professor Ruger as saying that Rehnquist “moder-
ated when he became chief justice”). 
92 FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT:  THE COL-
LEGIAL GAME 35 (2000).  An earlier study reached similar findings.  Chief Justice as-
signments of civil liberty opinions during the Warren Court suggested that opinions 
were assigned to ideologically compatible Justices, though this effect was limited some-
what by concern for external reaction.  David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice 
and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 652, 
677-78 (1972).  However, this pattern did not exist for economic cases before the War-
ren Court.  Gregory James Rathjen, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice, and Majority Opinion 
Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court:  A Replication, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 713, 719 (1974). 
93 Sometimes the identity of an opinion author may render the decision more ac-
ceptable.  For example, Chief Justice Hughes would assign decisions striking down 
New Deal statutes to more liberal Justices, such as Justice Brandeis.  David J. Danelski, 
Conflict and Its Resolution in the Supreme Court, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 71, 78 (1967). 
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substantive content is controlled by the median member of the major-
ity coalition, regardless of who drafts the opinion.94  If so, the opinion 
assignment authority provides relatively little power to the Chief.  Ar-
guably, the existing research has focused unduly on the opinion as-
signment power, at the expense of other sources of influence of the 
Chief Justice.95
Some quantitative evidence demonstrates the influence of the 
Chief Justice during the certiorari process as well.  As noted above, the 
Chief has predominant influence over the discuss list of cases to be 
considered by the Court.96  Moreover, certiorari is more likely to be 
granted in those cases selected by the Chief.  In the 1990 Term, 37.6% 
of the cases chosen by the Chief Justice were selected for certiorari, 
while the highest rate for any other Justice was 20%.97  Indeed, 78.6% 
of the cases heard that Term came from Chief Justice Rehnquist’s se-
lections.98  Strategically used, this authority could give the Chief con-
siderable agenda-setting power. 
Other empirical evidence might permit an inference of the Chief 
Justice’s influence on Court cohesion.  Paul Edelman and Suzanna 
Sherry have examined the size of majority coalitions in several natural 
courts.99  Their data revealed that Rehnquist Court majorities were 
more successful in winning over the final Justice to gain a unanimous 
opinion than were Burger or Warren Court majorities.100  This is not 
strong evidence of a Chief Justice effect, however, because of numer-
ous other differences among those Courts.101
94 See Chad Westerland, Who Owns the Majority Opinion?  An Examination of Pol-
icy Making on the U.S. Supreme Court 29-30 (Aug. 29, 2003) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (finding that the prob-
ability of Justices writing separate opinions was predicted by their ideological distance 
from the median member of the majority, not by their ideological distance from the 
opinion author). 
95 See Davis, supra note 12, at 140 (observing that it was “unfortunate” that so much 
research focuses on opinion assignment, thereby presenting an “incomplete” picture 
of the Chief’s leadership). 
96 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of the 
discuss list in the certiorari process). 
97 Caldeira et al., supra note 37, at 23. 
98 Id. at 24. 
99 Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing:  Explaining the Size of Supreme 
Court Majorities, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1225 (2000). 
100 Id. at 1241-42. 
101 Id. at 1245 (noting, for example, that “over the course of four decades, the Su-
preme Court changes in many ways” and that “[t]he personalities of the individual Jus-
tices and their interactions with one another are different for each Court”). 
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On the other hand, there is compelling evidence that the Chief 
Justice has affected the norm of separate opinion writing.  For the first 
150 years of U.S. history, Supreme Court opinions were characterized 
by consensus, with relatively few concurring and dissenting opinions.  
“In the early 1940s, however, the conventions of the Court radically 
changed,” and the number of dissenting and concurring opinions 
“surged to unprecedented levels.”102  An empirical study of this 
change found that it could not be attributed to changes in jurisdiction 
or caseload or the Court’s ideological composition.103  Instead, the 
change seemed to be due to the leadership style and ability of Chief 
Justice Stone.104
A subsequent empirical analysis of the data similarly concluded 
that the rise in separate opinions was due to the leadership of the 
Chief Justice or lack thereof.105  Data on such independent opinions 
shows considerable variation over time, with statistically significant dif-
ferences mainly in the Hughes and Stone Courts.106  While the authors 
of these studies have successfully ruled out other logical explanations 
for the increase of independent opinions, they could not exclude the 
possibility that the change was due simply to the broader tenor of the 
legal times and to the growth of legal realism, both of which were co-
incident with the increased number of separate opinions.107  Neverthe-
less, the results suggest a Chief Justice effect. 
This historical analysis suggests that the Chief Justice has some 
ability to define the Court’s culture and norms, which may dramati-
cally influence the Court’s functioning.  That culture may be one of 
collegiality in which Justices are more likely to join majority opinions, 
even if they have some disagreement with their language or even re-
sults.  At this point, however, it is unclear that a Chief Justice has the 
power to reverse the frequency of dissents and concurrences.  Once 
the Pandora’s Box was opened by Chief Justice Stone, the Chief’s abil-
ity to influence independent decision making by Associate Justices 
may have become quite limited. 
102 Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the 
United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 362 (1988). 
103 Id. at 364-78. 
104 Id. at 378-80. 
105 Stacia L. Haynie, Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 
1158, 1165-66 (1992).  Haynie found that the increase in concurring opinions largely 
occurred under Justice Hughes, while dissents rose under Justice Stone.  Id. at 1164. 
106 Id. at 1163-65. 
107 Davis, supra note 12, at 144. 
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In terms of decisional influence, therefore, the effect of the Chief 
Justice might appear in several ways.  The Chief might exert a gravita-
tional pull on decisions of the full Court or on those of particular As-
sociate Justices.  The Chief might more successfully mold larger ma-
jorities in support of an opinion.  The Chief could have influence over 
the nature of cases accepted on certiorari or simply the number of 
cases accepted.  These influences have seen limited investigation, 
however, and this article strives to supplement this investigation with 
additional empirical evidence, focusing on the potential effect of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
II.  THE 2004 TERM 
We begin with an analysis of a unique natural experiment that 
arose during the 2004 Term, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist fell ill 
with thyroid cancer and stopped presiding over the Court for four 
months.108  During this time, Justice Stevens took over as Acting Chief 
Justice.  Justice Rehnquist neither attended oral argument nor, pre-
sumably, the conference vote on the cases immediately following oral 
argument, over which Justice Stevens presided.109  Justice Rehnquist 
did not participate in decisions for the first month of his absence but 
cast votes on cases in the succeeding months.110  This episode offers a 
natural, if brief, experiment on the influence of the Chief Justice, 
both because the number of cases in both sets is roughly equal, and 
because Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens are considered ideo-
logical opposites. 
Relatively little press discussion focused on the effect of Justice 
Rehnquist’s absence, save for a suggestion that it might have delayed 
the writing of opinions.111  Others suggested there might be a greater 
108 See Tony Mauro, Illness Keeps Rehnquist From the Bench, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2004, at 10.  The Chief Justice underwent significant surgery for thyroid cancer in late 
October, which was followed by radiation and chemotherapy treatments.  Id.  The 
Chief Justice temporarily left the Court in November 2004 and resumed his duties in 
March 2005. 
109 See Linda Greenhouse, While Rehnquist Is Treated, Life at the Court Proceeds, but 
With Sadness and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at A25 (describing how Justice 
Stevens, as the senior Associate Justice, presided “over courtroom sessions and the jus-
tices’ private conferences”). 
110 The Chief Justice initially sought to return to work after just the first month but 
was medically unable to do so.  Linda Greenhouse & Katharine Q. Seelye, Rehnquist 
Fails to Return, and Speculation Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at A1. 
111 See Tony Mauro, Waiting Game Continues on Sentencing, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 20, 
2004, at 10. 
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impact.  At an ABA convention, Kenneth Starr and other panelists 
suggested that the ascendancy of Justice Stevens to Acting Chief Jus-
tice caused the Court to issue more liberal opinions, a thesis discussed 
at the Volokh Conspiracy blog.112  The suggestion was based only on an-
ecdotal evidence, however.  This Part examines whether the switch 
from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Acting Chief Justice Stevens actually 
appeared to make a difference. 
We examined all cases decided with full opinions during the Su-
preme Court’s 2004 Term, including the closely divided decision in 
Medellin v. Dretke, which dismissed the petitioner’s writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted.113  Justice Stevens presided over forty cases in 
this set; Chief Justice Rehnquist presided over thirty. 
We first analyze the Chief’s success at promoting court cohesion.  
One might expect that Chief Justice Rehnquist might have more suc-
cess at marshalling a unified Court than would Justice Stevens.  Justice 
Rehnquist had years to cultivate the relationships and leadership skills 
to build coalitions, while Justice Stevens was unexpectedly thrust into 
the role of Acting Chief Justice.  Table 1 reports the percentage of 
unanimous opinions and the percentage of decisions that turned on a 
single vote during the respective tenures of Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Acting Chief Justice Stevens during the 2004 Term. 
 
Table 1:  Court Cohesion Under Two Leaders, 2004 Term 
 
Cohesion Rehnquist Chief Stevens Acting Chief 
Unanimous .43 .40 
One-Vote Majority .20 .30 
  N=70. 
 
Chief Justice Rehnquist did slightly better on these cohesiveness 
measures than did Justice Stevens, as hypothesized.  The magnitude of 
the difference was not great, however, so no confident conclusions 
can be reached about the change in Chief Justice on Court cohesion. 
Although the foregoing analysis is not dispositive, other hypothe-
ses about the 2004 Term centered on the ideological direction of the 
Court’s decisions.  Some suggested that upon becoming Acting Chief 
Justice, Justice Stevens effectively took control and drove the Court in 
 
112 Posting of Todd Zywicki to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/ 
1123540096.shtml (Aug. 8, 2005, 6:28 EST). 
113 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2089 (2005). 
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a liberal direction.  There is little doubt that Justices Stevens and 
Rehnquist differed ideologically and commonly found themselves op-
posed in close cases.  To test for the effect of the Chief Justice on out-
comes, therefore, we simply compare the number of cases in which 
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens dissented from the majority during 
each of their tenures as Chief Justice.114  If the Chief Justice were in-
deed influential in determining outcomes, through agenda setting or 
other measures, one would expect that the Justice would be in dissent 
less often while serving as Chief Justice.  Table 2 reports the results as 
the percentage of cases in which each of the Justices dissented, by the 
cases in which they served as Chief Justice. 
 
Table 2:  Dissent Behavior by Two Leaders, 2004 Term 
 
Behavior Rehnquist Chief Stevens Acting Chief 
Rehnquist Dissent .100 .275 
Stevens Dissent .300 .250 
 
The results definitely conform to the hypothesis about the influ-
ence of the Chief Justice.  Justice Rehnquist’s dissents rose dramati-
cally during the period when Justice Stevens was Acting Chief.  More-
over, these numbers likely understate the effect because they 
incorporate some cases in which Justice Rehnquist did not participate 
(and therefore could not dissent), including at least one case in which 
a dissent by Justice Rehnquist seems likely to have occurred.115  The 
effect on Justice Stevens’s dissents was not so dramatic but was also in 
the expected direction. 
The test of the 2004 Term is intriguing but far from conclusive.  
The sample size is small and too many relevant explanatory variables 
are thus beyond realistic control.  The findings could be attributed, 
for example, to the different set of cases on the docket during the 
times that Justices Rehnquist and Stevens served as Chief.  Neverthe-
less, this natural experiment does provide some suggestive evidence 
 
114 According to our coding conventions, the Justice was considered a dissenter if 
he dissented from any part of the majority opinion. 
115 Most of the cases in which Justice Rehnquist did not participate were fairly un-
controversial, but Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005), was a criminal case de-
cided on a 5-3 vote, with Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy as dissenters.  Had Jus-
tice Rehnquist participated in and dissented from this ruling, his dissent percentage 
under Acting Chief Justice Stevens would rise to 30%, or three times the rate at which 
he dissented while serving as Chief. 
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about the authority of the Chief Justice by indicating that the presid-
ing Chief Justice may have considerable influence on outcomes.  In 
the following Part, we test this theory on a much larger set of data 
provided by the Spaeth U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database.116
III.  BROADER EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S INFLUENCE 
The Supreme Court Database includes variables reflecting the 
ideological direction of Justices’ votes, the nature and number of the 
cases taken by the Court, the decision of the full Court and votes of 
individual Justices, and many other items of interest.  This Part em-
barks on some preliminary empirical analysis regarding the influence 
of the Chief Justice.  To do so, we focus on the transition from Justice 
Rehnquist’s service as Associate Justice (1972-1985 Terms) to his ser-
vice as Chief (1986-2004 Terms), exploring the effect of the transition 
on Supreme Court decisions as well as on Justice Rehnquist’s behavior 
individually.  In this sense, we seek to evaluate the notion that “[o]ne 
indicator of the power of a chief justice is how much things can 
change at the Court when a new chief takes office.”117
Comparing transitions as a measure of the Chief Justice’s power 
and authority, as we do here, has theoretical and practical limitations, 
however.  Suppose that a powerful and effective conservative Chief 
Justice was replaced by a new powerful and effective conservative 
Chief Justice.  The measure of the transition effect in such a case 
would be null, but this would not disprove the influence of the Chief 
Justice.  It would only show that the succeeding Chief Justice was 
comparable to the predecessor.  If the transition did mark a change in 
the Court’s decisional outcomes, however, it would provide more per-
suasive evidence of the Chief’s influence.  Moreover, studying the ele-
vation of Chief Justice Rehnquist might be expected to produce such 
an effect if it has the potential to exist.  The Court under Chief Justice 
Burger was rife with confusion and contentiousness.  In contrast, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist was a more able administrator, who was able 
116 The United States Supreme Court Judicial Database is a multi-user database 
that provides detailed data, including ideological direction, on Supreme Court deci-
sions since the start of the Warren Court.  Harold J. Spaeth, The S. Sidney Ulmer Pro-
ject:  U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Databases, http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/ 
sctdata.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). 
117 Mauro, supra note 2, at 10. 
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to create a more collegial decision-making environment.118  Although 
Justice Rehnquist is regarded as more conservative than Justice Bur-
ger, the liberals on the Court generously praised his new leadership 
regime.119  Thus, if the Chief Justice’s leadership matters, one might 
expect it to appear in a study of this transition.  Justice Rehnquist’s 
relatively lengthy service as both an Associate Justice and then as Chief 
Justice facilitates this comparison. 
Such transition testing is a very rough measure, of course.  Justice 
Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice at the same time that Justice 
Scalia joined the Court.  Consequently, any change with the transition 
might be due to Justice Scalia’s influence, or the interactive combina-
tion of Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, rather than to the Chief Justice 
effect alone.120  In addition, the transition period itself is not precise.  
The new Chief’s “leadership style” will “take[] time to develop” and 
“some period of adjustment is inherent in the chief’s development of 
strategies necessary to ‘marshall’ the Court and for the Court to effec-
tively respond to his leadership style.”121  If so, the effects of a Chief on 
Court decisions would appear only after a lag period.  Finally, since we 
look at trends over time, a number of additional variables could con-
found the analysis.  For example, we evaluate Justice Rehnquist’s pro-
pensity to concur over the two periods.  His decreased inclination to 
concur as Chief Justice, as we observe it in the data, could be the re-
sult of his enhanced interest in cohesion on the Court, or it could be 
due to the Court’s shift to the right—obviating the need for Justice 
Rehnquist, a conservative, to present an alternative perspective. 
118 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (referring to some of the multiple 
commentators who have remarked on the relative influence of Justice Rehnquist on 
the Court). 
119 Justice Stevens expressed “sincere appreciation for the exemplary way in 
which . . . [Chief Justice Rehnquist] performed the special responsibilities of [his] high 
office, with particular emphasis on the efficiency, good humor and absolute impartial-
ity that [he] . . . consistently displayed when presiding at our conferences.”  Green-
house, supra note 8, at A16.  The transitional effect is described in O’BRIEN, supra note 
13, at 203-04; see also BAUM, supra note 3, at 166-68 (discussing Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s ability to be a more effective leader of the Court than was Chief Justice 
Burger).  Indeed, some have considered Justice Rehnquist a “dominant” Chief, though 
others have suggested that his Court was truly controlled by its “swing justices.”  Gar-
nett, supra note 17, at 34. 
120 Prior research has shown different voting patterns on civil liberties cases in dif-
ferent Courts (for example, the Warren Court, the Burger Court, and the Rehnquist 
Court), but has attributed this to the ideological composition of different Courts, 
rather than a Chief Justice effect.  See Lawrence Baum, Membership Change and Collective 
Voting Change in the United States Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 3, 10-21 (1992). 
121 Haynie, supra note 105, at 1161-62 (citation omitted). 
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Nevertheless, analysis of trends is suggestive and can serve as the 
basis for future empirical research that may tease out these underlying 
relationships.  In this Part, therefore, we present a preliminary em-
pirical analysis on the effects of the Chief Justice on Supreme Court 
decisions, focusing on Chief Justice Rehnquist.  We begin with an 
analysis of Justice voting and case outcomes.  While Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s leadership does not appear to dramatically affect ideo-
logical outcomes overall, this Part examines whether Justice Rehnquist 
successfully achieved other objectives.  We examine his effect on the 
neutral goals of Court cohesion and on the cases taken for the Court’s 
docket.  Finally, we examine the Rehnquist Court’s record on “judicial 
activism,” for which the Court has commonly been criticized.  The 
evidence suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist may indeed have had 
some impact on the Court’s decisionmaking, although future multi-
variate analysis would provide additional evidence of such an effect. 
A.  Chief Justice Effects on Case Votes and Cohesion 
This Part presents data on the effect of Justice Rehnquist’s eleva-
tion to Chief Justice on case outcomes.  Justice Rehnquist is certainly a 
conservative, so one might expect him to try to drive judicial decisions 
in a conservative direction.  Keith Whittington’s summary of Justice 
Rehnquist’s service conceded that while he did not fully realize this 
jurisprudential goal in case outcomes overall, Justice Rehnquist did 
lead “a revitalized strand of judicial conservatism.”122  For Whittington, 
it “seems clear that the chief justice has directed the Court toward a 
different destination.”123  If so, his service might be expected to have 
produced an increased percentage of conservative decisions, or, con-
versely, a decreased percentage of liberal outcomes over the period.  
This effect can be measured by evaluating the directional outcome for 
cases by Term.  Figure 1 presents the percentage of liberal decisions 
in criminal procedure and civil liberties cases from 1972 to 2004.124
122 Keith E. Whittington, William H. Rehnquist:  Nixon’s Strict Constructionist, Reagan’s 
Chief Justice, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE:  UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 8, 8 (Earl 
M. Maltz ed., 2003). 
123 Id. at 27. 
124 For this and all other analyses, we used case citation as the unit of analysis and 
omitted cases decided with memorandum opinions or decrees.  The coding conven-
tions used to identify the ideological direction of the case outcomes are available at 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, S. SIDNEY ULMER PROJECT FOR RESEARCH IN LAW AND JUDICIAL PRO-
JECTS, THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE: 1953-2003 
TERMS:  DOCUMENTATION (2005), http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/ 
allcourt_codebook.pdf. 
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Figure 1:  Percent Liberal Outcomes in Criminal Procedure  
and Civil Liberties Decisions 
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Figure 1 displays little trend toward more conservative decisions 
by the Supreme Court over the period, either in criminal procedure 
or civil liberties cases.  Indeed, given the fact that Justice Scalia joined 
the Court in 1986 and was soon joined by Justice Thomas, it may be 
surprising that the Court did not shift even further in a conservative 
direction over the time period covered in the figure.  When consider-
ing these findings, there is no reason to believe that Justice 
Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief drove the Court to produce more conser-
vative case outcomes.  The Rehnquist Court certainly has not broadly 
rolled back the liberal precedents of the Warren Court, and the pe-
riod has been called “The Revolution that Wasn’t.”125
The data on case outcomes may simply be too unrefined to iden-
tify an ideological effect.  They show nothing about the content of the 
opinions issued by the Court or the content of the cases taken on cer-
tiorari.  In some major issue areas, the Court clearly has become more 
 Note that Justice Rehnquist joined the Court in 1972 and became Chief Justice in 
1986. 
125 M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution that Wasn’t, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 47 (2004). 
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conservative.  For example, the Rehnquist Court has plainly limited 
the availability of habeas corpus.126  The shift from the governing rule 
for abortion restrictions in Roe v. Wade127 to the governing rule in Ca-
sey128 clearly reflects a movement away from reproductive rights,129 
though it fell far short of the reversal of Roe that conservatives sought.  
Such examples, however, cannot illustrate any distinct effect of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist.  Nor do these quantitative results provide any in-
formation on the nonideological components of decisions, such as 
Court cohesion.  The remainder of this Article embarks on an investi-
gation of whether the transition from Chief Justice Burger to Chief 
Justice Rehnquist is associated with changes in other measures of Su-
preme Court decisionmaking. 
We begin with an analysis of Court cohesion.  One conventional 
view of Court dynamics is purely ideological, as evidenced by the 
analyses of Justice voting.  But at least theoretically, the Chief is likely 
to be concerned with other institutional considerations that are non-
ideological in nature.  One such consideration is the extent to which 
the Justices render decisions that are unmarred by dissenting or con-
curring opinions.  Such cohesive decisionmaking can influence the 
power of opinions rendered by the Court, shape lower courts’ imple-
mentation of those opinions, and affect the Court’s legitimacy in the 
public eye.130  Some commentators have suggested that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was a failure at building Court consensus.  Thus, arguably 
the “norm of individual opinions may have grown even stronger un-
der Chief Justice Rehnquist.”131  Others have even described the 
Rehnquist Court as fragmented.132
126 See Davis, supra note 12, at 143 (describing Rehnquist’s “victory in reducing ha-
beas corpus”). 
127 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
128 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
129 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 124 
(1999) (reporting that Casey “made it substantially easier for the states to adopt regula-
tions restricting the availability of abortion”). 
130 Majority opinions with the support of more Justices tend to have greater power 
as precedents and may benefit the Court in other ways as well.  See, e.g., Cross, supra 
note 51, at 554-57 (discussing the potential value of larger majorities in their potential 
to give “compelling force” to the result); see also supra notes 81-89 and accompanying 
text.  Unanimous opinions may be especially important to the influence of Supreme 
Court opinions; see also MURPHY, supra note 13, at 66 (declaring that “[t]he greater the 
majority, the greater the appearance of certainty and the more likely a decision will be 
accepted and followed in similar cases”). 
131 Davis, supra note 12, at 144. 
132 Cornell Clayton, Law, Politics, and the Rehnquist Court:  Structural Influences on 
Supreme Court Decision Making, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 151, 161-
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Our analysis considers both the behavior of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist himself and of the Court under his leadership.  The follow-
ing figures reflect trends in the Court’s decisions as well as those of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, before and after his elevation to Chief.  These 
trends display both the immediate effect of the Rehnquist Court and 
its gradual effect over time.  We begin by studying Justice Rehnquist’s 
individual voting behavior and whether becoming Chief Justice af-
fected his willingness to write separately.  Figure 2 presents the fre-
quency with which Justice Rehnquist voted with the majority, with 
separate data points and trend lines for his time as an Associate and as 
Chief Justice. 
 
Figure 2:  Rehnquist Votes with Majority 
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162 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999); see also Timothy Sandefur, The 
Rehnquist Legacy, LIBERTY, Nov. 2005, at 25, available at http://libertyunbound.com/ 
archive/2005_11/sandefur-rehnquist.html (characterizing the Rehnquist Court as 
“fractured” and discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s inability to achieve consensus). 
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These results show a distinct change in Justice Rehnquist’s behav-
ior following his elevation to Chief Justice.  Although no apparent 
trend existed in his interest in filing or joining an independent opin-
ion before he was elevated, thereafter it appears that he became more 
inclined to join the majority opinion.  Before becoming Chief, Justice 
Rehnquist voted in the majority around eighty percent of the time.  As 
Chief, he voted with the majority over eighty-five percent of the time.  
In some years, as an Associate Justice, he felt free to refuse to join the 
majority over twenty-five percent of the time.  As a Chief, his highest 
rate of refusing to join the majority was seventeen percent.  Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s disinclination to express himself in an independent 
opinion is particularly apparent when one examines his rate of con-
curring opinions over the period.133
It is therefore possible that institutional features of the chief jus-
ticeship had an effect on Justice Rehnquist’s independent voting be-
havior.  While he continued to dissent on occasion, the rate of such 
action dropped.  At the margin, it appears that he was more willing to 
sacrifice his ability to express his own distinctive views in exchange for 
a larger majority.  This is suggestive of the “golden shackles” argument 
that being Chief limits a Justice’s freedom.134  There is, however, an 
alternative explanation.  When in the majority at conference, the 
Chief can designate the opinion writer, a potentially strategic and 
empowering effect.  Chief Justice Rehnquist may have joined more 
majorities in order to possess this assignment power and thereby in-
fluence the content of the resulting opinion.  Information on confer-
ence voting could help distinguish these explanations, but we lack 
that data.  It is also possible that when the Court’s membership 
changed with the addition of Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice 
Rehnquist more often found himself in a conservative majority.  This, 
too, would explain a reduction in his propensity to dissent. 
The next analysis considers whether becoming Chief Justice af-
fected the probability that Justice Rehnquist would concur.  If the 
Chief votes with the majority at conference, she may both assign the 
majority opinion and file a concurring opinion that expresses her 
views more precisely.  Thus, she could control the opinion assignment 
and still fulfill her expressive interests in opinion writing by later filing 
a separate concurring opinion.  Figure 4 presents the rates at which 
133 See infra figure 3. 
134 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Rehnquist filed concurring opinions over the years, with sepa-
rate trend lines for his service as Associate Justice and as Chief Justice. 
 
Figure 3:  Rehnquist Concurs as Associate and Chief 
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These results show that the probability of a Rehnquist concur-
rence declined after he became Chief Justice.  This finding suggests 
some increased concern for Court cohesion on his part after becom-
ing Chief Justice.  Although Chief Justice Rehnquist continued to file 
concurring opinions, he did so four percent of the time or less in the 
vast majority of years.  By contrast, as an Associate, he filed concurring 
opinions four percent of the time or more in every year but his first. 
The above evidence on Justice Rehnquist’s concurrences is not 
terribly dramatic.  The absolute number of fewer concurrences is not 
great, averaging only one or two fewer concurrences per year follow-
ing Justice Rehnquist’s elevation to Chief.  Moreover, this only con-
tributes to cohesion in his own vote and illustrates only the “golden 
shackles” theory of being Chief Justice.  Ideally, we think that a Chief 
Justice could use her power to induce greater consensus among the 
other members of the Court.  This requires consideration of the be-
havior of the Court as a whole and whether it appeared to change fol-
lowing the transition from Chief Justice Burger to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.  Data on the frequency of overall concurrences are pre-
sented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4:  Decisions with Concurrence 
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The break in the trend lines here suggests that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist may have had some effect on Court cohesion generally.  
Concurrences were steadily increasing during the Burger Court but 
that trend was stalled in the time period of the Rehnquist Court.  The 
break was not as dramatic as it was for Justice Rehnquist’s individual 
behavior, which might be expected—he had to steadily learn his role 
as Chief Justice and how to influence other Justices to join a majority 
opinion.  Once again, the effect is not a highly dramatic one, as the 
overall rate of concurrences declined only slightly.  The possible in-
fluence of Chief Justice Rehnquist on dissent is considered in Figure 
5.  This figure displays the number of decisions with at least one dis-
sent, the converse of a unanimous opinion. 
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Figure 5:  Decisions with Dissent 
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This figure suggests that dissents may have been on the decline 
even before Justice Rehnquist became Chief, and that trend clearly 
continued after he obtained the position. 
The circumstances of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure do not pro-
vide a perfect natural experiment because other intervening factors 
that cannot be controlled may explain the differences in Court cohe-
sion.  Perhaps the most obvious and significant intervening factor, the 
addition of Justice Scalia, suggests that our data may understate the 
positive effect of Chief Justice Rehnquist on Court cohesion.  Justice 
Scalia has the highest probability of any recent Justice of filing a spe-
cial concurrence; he also files a significant number of dissents.135  On 
the other hand, the Court may have become more cohesive over the 
period after the retirements of Justices Brennan and Marshall, who 
were far more liberal than any of the Justices who later joined the 
Court.  Thus, a decrease in the range of ideological preferences asso-
ciated with the individual Justices could also account for this apparent 
increase in Court cohesion.  Indeed, to the extent that Justice 
Rehnquist moderated his own behavior after becoming Chief, it would 
have affected the mean of the Court as a whole. 
135 SEGAL ET AL., supra note 42, at 336 tbl.13.1. 
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One final important measure of cohesion is found in the number 
of plurality opinions.  The presence of such an opinion reflects some 
level of failure by the Supreme Court.  While such opinions resolve 
the case before the Court, the lack of a governing majority opinion 
leaves the law in a state of uncertainty.  The plurality opinion’s “au-
thority as a precedent, as a guide to the decisions of other courts, is 
severely compromised.”136  Thus, it is in the Court’s interest to limit 
the number of plurality opinions.  Figure 6 shows the trend in plural-
ity opinions during Justice Rehnquist’s tenure on the Court. 
 
Figure 6:  Plurality Opinions, 1972-2004 
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 Again we see a remarkable change in the number of plurality 
opinions over the period analyzed.  This result could be attributed to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s marshalling of the Court, or it could be due 
to the decrease in the size of the Court’s docket over the same period. 
These results show some pronounced differences in Justice 
Rehnquist’s behavior after becoming Chief and also some modest co-
hesion differences between the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.  It is 
136 Id. at 335; see generally John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples:  
Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 62 (explaining that plurality 
opinions “may compromise [the Court’s] professional and public acceptance,” carry 
“less precedential weight,” and “often fail[] to give definitive guidance as to the state of 
the law”). 
  
1696 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1665 
impossible to conclusively assign these differences to Justice 
Rehnquist’s elevation to Chief, as Justice Scalia joined the Court at the 
same time.  The results are suggestive, however, and they are generally 
consistent with scholarly opinion on the effect of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.  It appears that Chief Justice Rehnquist effectively dis-
charged his managerial responsibility in achieving increased Court 
cohesion. 
B.  Chief Justice Effects on Case Selection 
As discussed above, the Chief Justice has some unique ability to in-
fluence the cases chosen for Court review, and one might expect 
more of an effect here than on case outcomes. 
The first analysis considers simply the absolute number of cases 
taken by the Court. 
 
Figure 7:  Decisions with Written Opinion, 1972-2004 
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The results are striking.  The Rehnquist Court was widely known 
for managing a significantly smaller docket than the Burger Court. 
Another issue involves the types of cases on which the Court ac-
cepts certiorari; a Chief Justice can direct the course of the law simply 
through the types of cases the Court selects for review.  Case types can 
be broken down in various ways; we begin the analysis by examining 
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broad case categories.  We first graph the number of cases taken each 
year in two important areas—criminal procedure and civil rights and 
liberties.  Figure 8 displays the percentage of the docket devoted to 
these issue areas for each of the years of Justice Rehnquist’s service on 
the Supreme Court. 
 
Figure 8:  Docket Composition, 1971-2004 
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Here we see no significant change in the Court’s docket, at least 
with respect to these broad issue categories.  There appears to be a 
slight increase in criminal procedure cases as a percentage of the 
docket, but, given the shrinking size of the docket, the Rehnquist 
Court took fewer criminal procedure cases in absolute numbers than 
did the Burger Court.  The Court’s attention to these key legal issues 
has obviously varied over the years, but there is no clear and dramatic 
pattern of change in broad priorities during the tenure of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist. 
In terms of more narrow issue areas, Chief Justice Rehnquist is as-
sociated with concern for federalism and the protection of states’ legal 
rights.137  His success in this regard has been called the “Rehnquist 
137 See Davis, supra note 12, at 142 (observing that the “overarching theme of 
Rehnquist’s decision-making is state-centered federalism”). 
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Court’s Velvet Revolution,”138 with commentators noting that Chief 
Justice Rehnquist was “most successful in reinvigorating interest in 
federalism on the Court.”139  His tenure is also associated with a con-
cern over the expansion of judicial power.140  One might expect this 
preference to appear in the cases that his Court selected for certiorari.  
Figure 9 reports the percentage of the docket devoted to cases involv-
ing federalism, interstate relations, and judicial power during Justice 
Rehnquist’s tenure on the Supreme Court. 
 
Figure 9:  Docket Composition:  
Federalism/Judicial Power/Interstate Relations 
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138 Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us:  Explaining the Court’s Federalism 
Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 496 (2001). 
139  Whittington, supra note 122, at 23. 
140 See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt, Wrong, but Not Too Right, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2005, 
at 36 (noting that as Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist appeared more concerned with 
expanding judicial power than producing conservative outcomes). 
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The results show an upward trend in the docket percentage of 
cases in these issue areas taken by the Supreme Court, though the 
trend appears to have begun before Justice Rehnquist became Chief 
Justice, and the magnitude of the change is not great.  Moreover, be-
cause of the shrunken docket, the absolute number of federalism 
cases is fewer than for many years of the Burger Court.  These pure 
quantitative measures do not capture the full story, however.  The 
Rehnquist Court has seen the issuance of some of the potentially most 
significant federalism decisions, such as United States v. Lopez.141  The 
Court’s pro-federalism decisions are not entirely consistent or far-
reaching, however, and an analysis of the decisions has found their ef-
fects to be relatively pragmatic and minimalist.142
Another important consideration in the makeup of the Supreme 
Court docket is the resolution of circuit court conflicts.  To the extent 
that Chief Justice Rehnquist and his Court were more concerned with 
the Court’s responsibility to resolve such conflicts, they may have cho-
sen more intercircuit conflicts to resolve as a percentage of the overall 
docket.  Figure 10 displays the percentage of docket cases that in-
volved intercircuit conflicts. 
 
Figure 10:  Intercircuit Conflicts Cases as  
Percent of Overall Docket 
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141 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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 Once again, we see a striking change associated with the 
Rehnquist Court.  The percentage of the docket devoted to conflicts 
cases nearly doubled over levels in the Burger Court.  This change did 
not reflect a particular commitment to reducing circuit conflicts, 
however.  The absolute number of conflicts resolved by the Rehnquist 
Court was fewer than in some years of the Burger Court.  Instead, the 
higher percentages reflect the reduced docket of the Rehnquist Court 
years.  In 1973, when less than twenty percent of the docket involved 
conflicts cases, the Court resolved thirty conflicts.  By contrast, in 
2003, when conflicts cases made up about a third of the docket, the 
Court resolved only twenty-five conflicts.  The remarkable change in 
the percentage of the Court’s docket taken up by conflicts cases is a 
result of the lesser number of nonconflicts cases accepted by the 
Rehnquist Court. 
The results demonstrate that the Rehnquist Court remained rea-
sonably attentive to the need to resolve circuit court conflicts, as have 
prior Courts, but showed much less interest in taking cases without 
circuit conflicts.  This is a curious phenomenon, without an obvious 
explanation.  One would think that the nonconflicts cases enable the 
Justices to choose the issues that interest them and on which they wish 
to make law.  These discretionary choices would seem to be at the root 
of the Court’s power, yet the Rehnquist Court limited them drasti-
cally.  Such an action might reflect a commitment to reduce the 
Court’s power in the U.S. governmental system, perhaps in response 
to attacks on judicial activism.  The next Part considers the Rehnquist 
Court and such judicial activism. 
C.  Chief Justice Effects on Judicial Activism 
One of the more common critiques of the recent Rehnquist Court 
is that it was an activist Court.  Cass Sunstein declared that “[w]e are 
now in the midst of a remarkable period of right-wing judicial activ-
ism.”143  Similarly, Larry Kramer has contended that “conservative ju-
dicial activism is the order of the day,”144 while others have called the 
Court’s federalism doctrine “an astonishing display of judicial activism 
142 See Clayton, supra note 132, at 171-75. 
143 Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, 
at A23. 
144 Larry D. Kramer, Op-Ed, No Surprise.  It’s an Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2000, at A33.  Professor Kramer has also referred to the “unparalleled activism” of the 
Rehnquist Court.  Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 959, 960 (2004). 
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not seen since the 1930s.”145  Yet in many ways, the concept of judicial 
activism has become more of an epithet than a thought.  It often 
means nothing more than reference to “an action taken by a court of 
which the speaker disapproves.”146  Conservatives declaimed the judi-
cial activism of the Warren Court, which liberals embraced, only to 
find their ideological positions reversed as the Court became more 
conservative. 
Even if activism is generally empty of meaning other than ideo-
logical disagreement, one can still measure certain elements com-
monly associated with such activism on their own terms.  A commonly 
invoked measure of judicial activism is the Court’s willingness to in-
validate statutes.  While this is not a perfect or complete measure of 
activism,147 it surely has a rough accuracy, because striking down legis-
lation is a clear flexing of judicial power at the expense of another 
branch of government.148  Richard Posner has suggested that he would 
like to see this metric for activism become “canonical,” because it in-
volves courts “acting contrary to the will of the other branches of gov-
ernment.”149  Ernest Young concedes that these are the “most dra-
matic instances” of judicial activism.150  Most of the past decisions cited 
as “activist” involved the invalidation of a statute, whether it be an anti-
145 Herman Schwartz, Introduction to THE REHNQUIST COURT:  JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
ON THE RIGHT 13, 19 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002).  Jonathan Molot details the 
Rehnquist Court’s activism, reviewing the Court’s record in terms of countermajori-
tarian decisions and adherence to neutral principles.  Jonathan T. Molot, Principled 
Minimalism:  Restriking the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1806-25 (2004). 
146 Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an “Activist” Court?:  The Commerce Clause 
Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2002). 
147 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1139, 1164-70 (2002) (addressing the concept of judicial activism and critiqu-
ing an excessive focus on statutory invalidation as the measure of activism).  Young 
suggests consideration of other forms of judicial activism, including departing from 
text or history, departing from precedent, issuing maximalist rulings, exercising broad 
remedial powers, and deciding ideologically.  Id. at 1144; see also Keenan D. Kmiec, The 
Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1463-76 (2004) 
(reviewing different definitions of judicial activism, including statutory invalidations 
and definitions that ignore precedent, departures from interpretive methodology, and 
results-oriented judging). 
148 See BAUM, supra note 3, at 194 (“Of the various forms of judicial activism, per-
haps the most important is making decisions that conflict with policies of the other 
branches.  This form of activisim is often gauged by the Court’s use of judicial review, 
its power to overturn acts of other policy makers on the ground that they violate the 
Constitution.”). 
149 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM 320 
(1996). 
150 Young, supra note 147, at 1145. 
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abortion law in Roe 151 or the Violence Against Women Act in Morri-
son152.  In addition, this measure has the advantages of being ideologi-
cally neutral and readily quantifiable and has been used as a proxy in 
other research.153
Critics of the Rehnquist Court have claimed that it has been all 
too ready to presume power for itself and strike down statutes.  In 
their view, Chief Justice Rehnquist is an activist who is quick to over-
rule the judgments of legislatures.  Standing opposite this stereotype, 
however, is Justice Rehnquist’s own judicial philosophy, which is “mis-
trustful of judges substituting their judgments of contested constitu-
tional rights for the judgments of popularly elected representatives.”154  
By this philosophy, one might expect Chief Justice Rehnquist, and the 
Court that he led, to be loathe to strike down statutes.  This is a con-
troversy that may be readily tested. 
As noted above, many have argued that the conservative 
Rehnquist Court was not true to its professed philosophy of judicial 
restraint, and some have supported this claim with modest empirical 
analyses.  In a controversial editorial, Paul Gewirtz and Chad Golder 
examined the Justice’s votes and found that on the Rehnquist Court, 
conservatives such as Justices Scalia and Thomas were most willing to 
strike down federal statutes.155  Stuart Taylor observed that between 
1994 and 2000, the Court invalidated twenty-three federal statutes, af-
ter it had invalidated only 128 in its entire prior history.156
To amplify this research, we compare statutory invalidations in the 
Rehnquist Court with those in the Burger Court, beginning with an 
analysis of federal statutes.  We used the Supreme Court database to 
identify all cases heard by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts during 
the 1971 to 2000 Terms in which the constitutionality of a statute was 
challenged on its face (as opposed to applied challenges), for all deci-
sion types except memorandum decisions and decrees.157  The num-
151 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
152 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
153 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 195, 213-17 (2003) (using statutory invalidations as measure to test activism as-
sociated with different state court selection methods). 
154 Whittington, supra note 122, at 16. 
155 Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, Op-Ed, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2005, at A19. 
156 Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, NAT’L J., June 10, 2000, at 1810, 1816. 
157 To execute this, we first used the “uncon” variable in the Supreme Court Data-
base to find cases in which a statute or ordinance was found unconstitutional.  We then 
used the “authdec” variable in the database to identify all cases where there might have 
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bers are relatively small and are displayed in Figure 11 as a histogram 
showing the absolute number of facial challenges considered each 
year and the number of statutes invalidated as facially unconstitu-
tional. 
 
Figure 11:  Judicial Activism:  Invalidation of Federal Statutes 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
Term
N
u
m
be
r 
of
 C
as
es
Federal Statutes Challenged Federal Statutes Invalidated
 
These results show some difference between the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts.  The Rehnquist Court was somewhat more likely to 
strike down federal statutes than its predecessor.  The most remark-
able change is the reduced number of challenges to statutes’ constitu-
tionality that the Court accepts.  The Rehnquist Court takes certiorari 
on very few challenges, save for cases in which it strikes down the stat-
ute, in contrast to the Burger Court, which took many more chal-
lenges and issued fewer invalidations.  While this is in part a function 
of the smaller docket of the Rehnquist Court as well as of changes in 
the Court’s jurisdictional statute in 1988, the difference exceeds even 
the reduction in the docket.  The Rehnquist Court seemed to be very 
reluctant to uphold the constitutionality of a statute.  In three of these 
years (1993, 1994, and 1997), the Court upheld no federal statutes 
been a constitutional challenge to the statute and then examined the opinion to de-
termine whether this was in fact the case.  Spaeth, supra note 116. 
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and in several other years (1988, 1990, 1995, and 1996) it upheld only 
one.  Table 3 provides mean statistics on federal statutory constitu-
tionality rulings during the periods when Justice Rehnquist was an As-
sociate Justice on the Burger Court and when he was the Chief Justice. 
 
Table 3:  Mean Federal Laws Challenged and Invalidated Per Term 
 
 Associate Justice 
Rehnquist 
Chief Justice 
Rehnquist 
Federal Laws  
Challenged  
5.875 4.26 
Federal Laws  
Invalidated  
1.125 1.86 
 
While the number of challenged statutes dropped significantly in 
the Rehnquist Court, the number of statutory invalidations increased 
distinctly.  The increased absolute number of statutory invalidations 
shows a greater measure of judicial activism by the Court, especially 
when one considers the smaller docket of the Rehnquist Court.  The 
reduced number of challenges is an interesting and somewhat curious 
finding that requires further exploration.  While due in part to the 
smaller docket, it may also be that the Court sought to allow the cir-
cuit courts to consider questions of federal statute constitutionality 
and to strike down their decisions as it saw fit in some future opin-
ion.158
Much of the discussion of Rehnquist Court activism has consid-
ered only federal statutes.  This can be misleading, as many of the 
Court’s past decisions that are considered the most activist struck 
down state statutes.  The critiques of Rehnquist Court activism have 
almost exclusively addressed its rulings on federal statutes, which ar-
guably reveal an implicit and “strong ideological bias.”159  To consider 
the level of activism in striking down state laws, Figure 12 considers 
the number of constitutional challenges to and invalidations of state 
statutes while Rehnquist was a Justice. 
 
 
158 The docket size reduction is not independent of this effect.  Indeed, the 
Court’s reluctance to take cases in which it would uphold federal statutes could ex-
plain some of the docket reduction. 
159 Young, supra note 147, at 1146 n.20. 
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Figure 12:  Judicial Activism: 
State Laws Challenged and Invalidated, 1972-2000 
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This figure shows a steadily declining number of state statutes 
challenged and invalidated as facially unconstitutional.  The decline is 
especially pronounced in the Rehnquist Court years.  While Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s Court was clearly more activist with respect to striking 
down federal statutes, it was much less activist with respect to invalida-
tion of state statutes.  This provides clearer evidence of its commit-
ment to federalism.  Table 4 provides mean statistics on state statute 
constitutionality rulings during the periods when Justice Rehnquist 
was an Associate Justice in the Burger Court and when he was the 
Chief Justice. 
 
Table 4:  Mean State Laws Challenged and Invalidated Per Term 
 
 Associate Justice 
Rehnquist 
Chief Justice 
Rehnquist 
State Laws Challenged 20.18 9.46 
State Laws Invalidated 9.875 4.33 
 
Here we see a remarkable decline in the number of constitutional 
challenges to state statutes and the number of invalidations of those 
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statutes, a reduction that exceeds the size of the overall docket reduc-
tion.  The reduction in annual invalidations is significant and under-
states the effect of the change, because each of those decisions serves 
as a precedent to be followed by lower courts.  The Rehnquist Court 
was much more deferential to state legislatures than were its predeces-
sors.  Statutory invalidation decisions may thus provide stronger evi-
dence of the Court’s states’ rights orientation than do even the feder-
alism decisions themselves. 
After suggesting that Justice Rehnquist was committed to judicial 
restraint, Keith Whittington went on to observe that the Rehnquist 
Court has indeed sought to use the judicial power to limit the gov-
ernment, but “less by carving out particular preferred freedoms than 
by imposing new obstacles on the exercise of central government au-
thority.”160  This suggestion is consistent with its pattern of striking 
down more federal statutes and fewer state statutes than the Burger 
Court.  This is a different sort of activism that constrains federal gov-
ernment power, but not through the Bill of Rights.  The Rehnquist 
Court was  clearly less activist toward state legislation and more activist 
in striking down federal legislation. 
Our measure of judicial activism is an imperfect one.  Not all stat-
utes are of equal societal significance, so strikes of statutes are not 
equivalent.  However, the data suggest that the Rehnquist Court was 
more activist in striking down federal statutes, often on federalism 
grounds, and much less activist in striking down state statutes under 
the Bill of Rights.  This change represents not so much greater or 
lesser activism on the whole, but a shift in the constitutional interest 
of the Court from the Amendments to the Articles and the structural 
makeup of the U.S. government, a shift in favor of state power.  It 
seems fair to attribute much of this change to Justice Rehnquist’s role 
as Chief, because these are the issues with which he is associated. 
CONCLUSION 
There is surely no universal association between the Chief Justice’s 
unique sources of authority and the Chief’s decisional power on the 
Court.  Some have been more primus and others more pares.  Yet the 
historical record may enable us to identify the potential power of the 
Chief Justice at the Court.  Chief Justice Rehnquist himself declared 
that “the Chief Justice has placed in his hands some of the tools which 
160 Whittington, supra note 122, at 27. 
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will enable him to be primus among the pares but his stature will de-
pend on how he uses them.”161  This Article provides some evidence of 
how Chief Justice Rehnquist used those tools. 
Our results are necessarily tentative and preliminary, as they have 
not conclusively isolated a Chief Justice effect.  However, they do pro-
vide insight into an understudied area of the law.  The Chief Justice 
remains but one vote among nine, and Chief Justice Rehnquist had 
little effect driving the Court in an overall conservative direction or 
reversing the Warren Court’s liberal precedents.  But our results sug-
gest that Justice Rehnquist’s service as Chief Justice did have some ef-
fect on the Court’s product, both institutionally and in the content of 
its decisional output. 
Much additional research should be conducted on this topic.  We 
have analyzed the effect of Chief Justice Rehnquist, but there is a 
wealth of historical information that would permit comparable studies 
of prior transitions of the chief justiceship.  Other than the change in 
individual opinion writing, attributed to Chief Justice Hughes, very lit-
tle of this work has been done.  It may well be that some primi have 
been much more effective than others, and some have been thor-
oughly ineffective.  Such discoveries could considerably inform future 
judgments about who should be appointed and confirmed to the posi-
tion. 
 
161 William H. Rehnquist, Lecture, Remarks of the Chief Justice:  My Life in the Law 
Series, 52 DUKE L.J. 787, 805 (2003). 
